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Modelling the Performance of Irish Credit Unions, 2002 to 2010. 
Abstract 
This study undertakes a modeling based performance assessment of all Irish credit unions between 
2002 and 2010, a particularly turbulent period in their history. The analysis explicitly addresses the 
current challenges faced by credit unions in that the modeling approach used rewards credit unions for 
reducing undesirable outputs (impaired loans and investments) as well as for increasing desirable 
outputs (loans, earning assets and members’ funds) and decreasing inputs (labour expenditure, capital 
expenditure and fund expenses).  The main findings are: credit unions are subject to increasing returns 
to scale; technical regression occurred in the years after 2007; there is significant scope for an 
improvement in efficiency through expansion of desirable outputs and contraction of undesirable 
outputs and inputs; and that larger credit unions, that are better capitalised and pay a higher dividend to 
members are more efficient than their smaller, less capitalised, and lower dividend paying counterparts.  
 
Keywords: Credit unions, efficiency, impaired loans and investments 
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Modelling the Performance of Irish Credit Unions, 2002 to 2010. 
 
1. Introduction 
Credit unions are not-for-profit, member-owned, voluntary, self-help, democratic, cooperative financial 
institutions that provide financial services to their members. In Ireland the credit union movement has 
one of the highest penetration levels in the world with approximately 65 percent of the population a 
member of a credit union. In 2010 there were 404 Irish credit unions with assets of €14.1 billion 
serving approximately 3 million members which equates to a population penetration level of 66 percent 
which suggests that credit unions are present in almost all communities in Ireland. Indeed, credit union 
penetration in Ireland is higher than in any other country in the world. The World Council of credit 
unions (WOCCU) estimated that in 2011 there were 51,013 credit unions in 100 countries, with 196.5 
million members holding $1.56 trillion in assets.  
 
From the mid-1990s to 2007, Irish banks significantly expanded lending to the commercial and 
residential property sector. The collapse in prices and activity in both these markets post-2007 coupled 
with the downturn in general economic activity necessitated a major bailout for all Irish banks which 
now rely substantially on liquidity support from the ECB and the Irish Central Bank (McQuinn and 
Woods, 2012). The collapse of the banking sector, stagnating property markets and fiscal austerity has 
put extreme pressure on Irish households. Personal consumer expenditure fell by 1.1% in 2008, 6.9% in 
2009, 0.8% in 2010, 2.5% in 2011 and is projected to fall by 2.0% in 2012 while the unemployment 
rate increased to 6.3% in 2008, 11.8% in 2009, 13.6% in 2010, 14.4% in 2011 and is forecast to be 
14.0% in 2012 (IBEC, January 2012). 
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In that credit unions through legislation have not been permitted to engage in mortgage lending they 
have been protected from the worst excesses of the Irish financial crisis. Credit unions operate 
predominantly in the market for shorter term loans (less than 5 years) to Irish households. The banks 
cover this market and in addition the markets for long term loans to Irish households, loans to non-
residents, and loans to the non-financial Irish private sector (outstanding value of €98 billion in 
September 2011). That said, post 2007, adverse economic conditions have still impacted on Irish credit 
unions. In 2008 loans written off were €41.85m, but rose to €87.95m in 2009 and €107.44m in 2010 
(1.7% of gross loans).  It is also the case that the decline in the fortunes of Irish credit unions is not 
wholly related to economic factors.  Other contributory factors include the business decisions of some 
credit unions and the deficiencies in the statutory regulatory framework, (Forsey, 2010).  
 
Concern over the current position faced by credit unions as well as concerns about their future 
development was such that the Irish Government established a Commission in May 2011 to review the 
structural and regulatory landscape within which credit unions operate. The Commission’s Report was 
published in March 2012 and identified a number of areas where reform is required ranging from the 
introduction of a new legislative framework to significant sectoral restructuring. With respect to the 
latter, the Commission argued that restructuring would involve moving from a situation where 408 
credit unions operate and act independently, to one where there is consolidation through amalgamations 
and the development of close networks and shared services.  They viewed restructuring as a way of 
addressing the current weaknesses in the sector as well as a business strategy for credit unions that 
want to achieve the scale necessary to move to a more efficient and sophisticated business model. 
Critical in the proposed plan is the identification of stronger credit unions which would anchor 
restructuring with other (weaker) participating credit unions.   
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The current empirical study which investigates the relative performance of Irish credit unions over the 
period 2002 to 2010 provides evidence in support of sectoral restructuring. Furthermore, the analysis 
explicitly addresses the current challenges faced by credit unions in that the modelling approach used 
rewards credit unions for reducing undesirable outputs (impaired loans and investments) as well as for 
increasing desirable outputs and decreasing inputs. A pioneering application of this modelling to 
banking is provided in Park and Weber (2006), which uses the directional distance function approach 
of Chung et al (1997) for handling good and bad outputs. The Park and Weber (2006) study employed 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) to empirically model the production technology and to measure each 
bank’s efficiency relative to the empirically-constructed best practice frontier.  This type of 
nonparametric analysis can be readily extended by adding a parametric second stage which employs a 
regression technique to infer how various producer-specific factors influence the relative efficiency of 
the financial institutions involved. As an alternative to the preceding two-stage method for 
investigating efficiency determinants, the current study uses an application of the innovative Cuesta et 
al (2009) parametric approach to efficiency measurement.   
 
The only previous investigation of Irish credit union performance is that of Glass et al. (2010) which is 
based on 2006 data and investigates performance determinants and the opportunity cost of regulatory 
compliance using a non-parametric methodology. A key finding of this analysis was that 68 percent of 
Irish credit unions do not incur an extra opportunity cost in meeting regulatory guidance on bad debt. 
The analysis also revealed that 93 percent of Irish credit unions operate at various levels of inefficiency 
and while best-practice and inefficient credit unions had many similar characteristics those identified as 
best-practice had much lower levels of bad debt and tended to be designated as industrial/associational 
credit unions. 
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The present study yields a rich set of results. The analysis highlights that (i) Irish credit unions could 
improve productive performance by expanding desirable outputs while simultaneously contracting 
impaired loans and investments and inputs; (ii) that Irish credit unions are subject to increasing returns 
to scale; (iii) that larger credit unions, that are better capitalised and pay a higher dividend to members 
are more efficient than their smaller, less capitalised, and lower dividend paying counterparts; and (iv) 
that credit union efficiency levels have deteriorated significantly post 2007.  These findings point to 
restructuring being necessary and additionally provide evidence that restructuring may be best achieved 
if it is anchored by those credit unions that pay better dividends, are larger and are better capitalised. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we overview the efficiency literature 
on credit unions. The methodology is outlined in Section 3 and the data described in Section 4. 
Empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5 with a summary and some concluding 
comments presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Efficiency Studies  
There is a large empirical literature on the measurement of cost structure and efficiency in the financial 
services industry (see Hughes and Mester, 2010). In contrasting the volume of work on banks with that 
on mutual financial services organizations, Worthington (2010, p.39-40) states:  
 
“In the main, the substantive part of this research has focused on medium-to-large deposit-taking 
institutions .....  [however], the need to understand issues of efficiency and productivity is no less 
pronounced in financial mutuals with the important role this information can provide in assessing the 
impact of regulation and yielding insights into the process of organisational and structural change 
characteristic of recent decades.”  
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Early studies in this area use either ratio analysis or simple production and cost functions to assess 
performance. For the US see for example Taylor (1972 and 1977), Wolken and Navratil (1980), Kohers 
and Mullis (1987 and 1988). For Australia, see Crapp (1983), Brown and O’Connor (1995) and more 
recently Esho (2000). For Canada, Murray and White (1983) and Kim (1986). For the UK, see 
McKillop et al. (1995) and for New Zealand Sibbald and McAlevey (2003). The general picture that 
emerges from these early studies is that credit union movements in most countries are characterised by 
increasing returns to scale. This provides a justification for growth strategies pursued by credit unions 
(either internally generated or via merger and acquisition) and for regulation permitting expansion of 
the common bond.   
 
More recently credit union performance (efficiency) has been assessed employing frontier efficiency 
measurement based upon parametric and non-parametric techniques. The empirical measurement of 
economic efficiency centres on determining the extent of either allocative efficiency (the ability of an 
organization to use its inputs in optimal proportions, given their prices and the production technology) 
or technical efficiency (the ability to use resources in the most technologically efficient manner) or 
both in a given organization or industry.   
 
For the US, Fried et al. (1993) evaluate performance using a Free Disposal Hull (FDH) analysis, which 
is a generalisation of DEA. The analysis highlights that there are a large number of best-practice credit 
unions with influences on efficiency traced to locational and institutional characteristics. Fried et al. 
(1996) use FDH to evaluate the performance of university-affiliated credit unions and compare their 
performance with that of other credit unions. They find support for the hypothesis that university-
affiliated credit unions, by virtue of the higher educational attainment of their membership, some of 
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whom sit on the board of directors that oversees management, operate more efficiently than other credit 
unions. Frame and Coelli (2001) employ a stochastic cost frontier to investigate US corporate credit 
unions for the period 1992-1997. They find that 91% are cost efficient, with those credit unions 
investing a greater proportion of their assets in a centralised fund being most efficient. Glass and 
McKillop (2006), utilise a stochastic frontier approach to examine cost inefficiency under different 
environmental situations. The results suggest that: federal credit unions are more cost efficient than 
state credit unions and larger credit unions and multiple group credit unions are more cost efficient than 
their smaller, and single bond, counterparts. Wheelock and Wilson (2011) use a non-parametric local-
linear estimator to estimate a cost relationship for credit unions and find evidence of increasing returns 
to scale over the period 1989-2006. They conclude that further deregulation which allows credit unions 
to expand their scale or scope of activities will lead to further increases in size and improvements in 
efficiency. 
 
For Australia, Worthington (1998) and Esho (2001) utilise the parametric stochastic frontier approach 
while Brown et al. (1999) uses non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA). Worthington (1998) 
notes that large well capitalised credit unions with small branch networks are more efficient. Esho 
(2001) notes that there is little improvement in average efficiency over the period 1985 to 1993. Brown 
et al. (1999) find no evidence that the average credit union moved closer to the efficient frontier 
 
For the UK, McKillop et al. (2002) use DEA to obtain radial and non-radial efficiency measures while 
McKillop et al. (2005) use a stochastic frontier analysis to evaluate the relative performance for the 
period 1991 to 2001. The results of both studies suggest that UK credit unions have considerable scope 
for efficiency gains. These studies also suggest that credit unions suffer from a considerable degree of 
scale inefficiency with in excess of 50 percent of scale inefficient credit unions subject to decreasing 
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returns to scale. Glass et al. (2010) assess the efficiency of Irish credit unions using a two-stage 
approach. The analysis revealed that 93 percent of Irish credit unions operate at various levels of 
inefficiency, with this leaving seven percent of credit unions identified as best-practice. While best-
practice and inefficient credit unions had many similar characteristics it was clear that those identified 
as best-practice had much lower levels of bad debt and tended to be designated as 
industrial/associational credit unions. A further insight to emerge from the analysis was that 68 percent 
of Irish credit unions do not face a specific extra opportunity cost of complying with bad debt 
guidelines as dictated by the regulatory authorities. 
 
Overall, there is less consistency in the observed findings for frontier based studies relative to the 
earlier production function and ratio based studies. Efficiency is influenced by an extensive range of 
factors, and the observed findings depend upon both the methodological approach utilised and the 
geographical area investigated. This is unsurprising given that the regulatory environment and maturity 
of credit unions differs between countries.  Finally, while a small number of studies find a positive 
impact of size on efficiency, the remaining (majority) find little evidence of an empirical relation.  
3.  Methodology 
This study examines the evolution of efficiency for Irish credit unions. In order to do this, we employ a 
translog enhanced hyperbolic distance function model to examine the relative performance of credit 
unions. Section 3.1 describes the enhanced hyperbolic distance function and efficiency, Section 3.2 
details the translog version of the function, while Section 3.3 demonstrates the manner in which the 
function can be estimated within a stochastic frontier framework.  
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3.1. The enhanced hyperbolic distance function and efficiency 
Let us consider a financial institution productive process that transforms input vectors 
1  ( ,..., )  
K
i i Kix x x R   into vectors of desirable outputs 1  ( ,..., )  
M
i i Miy y y R   and vectors of 
undesirable outputs 
1  ( ,..., )  
R
i i Rib b b R  , where    (1,..., )i N  is the set of observed financial 
institution  producers.  The production technology is given by 
   ( , , ) :  can produce ( , )T x y b x y b ,         (1) 
with this production possibility set assumed to be a compact set satisfying the axioms of production 
given in Färe and Primont (1995).  Following Cuesta et al (2009), the production technology can also 
be represented by what they call an enhanced hyperbolic distance function ( , , )ED x y b .  This represents 
the simultaneous maximum expansion of the desirable output vector and contractions of the 
undesirable output vector and input vector as defined by  
 ( , , )  inf   0 :  ( , / , )  ED x y b x y b T      .      (2) 
As (2) requires simultaneous equiproportionate expansion in y and contractions in b and x , it yields a 
hyperbolic path to the production frontier.   
 
When weak disposability of outputs and inputs is assumed, ( , , )ED x y b  fully characterizes the 
technology and has a range 0 ( , , )  1ED x y b  .  The enhanced hyperbolic distance function (2) thus 
provides an efficiency measure.  When the maximum equiproportionate expansion of y and reductions 
in b and x (required to place a given observation (cooperative bank) on the boundary of T ) is 
( , , ) = 1ED x y b , the given financial institution is deemed to be an efficient producer located on the 
production frontier.  Contrariwise, if ( , , )  1ED x y b  , the financial institution could improve its 
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productive efficiency by expanding its production of y and contracting its production of b and usage of 
x  - hence it is deemed to be an inefficient producer. 
 
As elucidated in Cuesta et al (2009), which extends Cuesta and Zofio (2005) by incorporating 
undesirable outputs, the enhanced hyperbolic distance function (2) satisfies the following properties: (i) 
it is almost homogeneous (ii) it is non-decreasing in desirable outputs, (iii) it is non-increasing in 
undesirable outputs and (iv) it is non-increasing in inputs. 
 
3.2. The translog specification of the enhanced hyperbolic distance function 
Property (i) above is particularly relevant to the empirical analysis as it can be imposed on a translog 
specification enabling the use of a parametric translog hyperbolic distance function for (technical) 
efficiency estimation. The model also allows for time-varying inefficiency (as explained further 
below).  This is important as it is unlikely that (technical) inefficiency remains constant over our 2002-
2010 time period.  Note also that, in the empirical analysis over 2002-2010, the model will also allow 
for technical change (or shifts in the production frontier) as well as for the foregoing change in 
technical inefficiency.  As indicated in Cuesta et al (2009), the translog enhanced hyperbolic distance 
function (or translog EHDF for short) can be estimated via a stochastic frontier framework to yield 
(technical) efficiency estimates for each credit union.  
 
3.3. Estimating the translog EHDF within a stochastic frontier framework  
In the stochastic frontier approach, a producer’s distance from the production frontier is viewed as the 
combined outcome of technical inefficiency and random shocks outside the producer’s control.  To 
incorporate these two components, a composed error term 
it is employed.  Within this additive error 
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term, the effects of random shocks on producer i are captured by a two-sided, random-noise component 
itv , while a one-sided error component itu  is used to capture inefficiency. 
The translog EHDF to be estimated is given by 
 * * * ln    ( , , ; , , , , , )    Mit it it it it ity TL x y b v u         ,       (4) 
where  ln  Mity corresponds to the dependent variable and the     it it itv u    is the composed error 
term.  The 
itv  are assumed to be independently and identically distributed as 
2(0, )vN  , independently 
distributed of the 
itu .  The itu  are defined so as to embody the assumption that environmental 
conditions influence a credit union’s technical inefficiency.  Hence the technical inefficiency term is 
made an explicit function of a vector of producer-specific environmental variables 
itz .  This is done by 
employing the Battese and Coelli (1995) maximum likelihood method which specifies that the 
itu  are 
independently (but not identically) distributed as truncations (at zero) of a general normal distribution 
of form 
 2 2
1
( , )    or   (  ,  )
J
it u j jit it u
j
N N z e   

              (5) 
where 
j  are parameters to be estimated and     is a random variable which is independently 
distributed as a truncation of a normal distribution   (      
 ) such that           . This means that 
    distributed as a non-negative truncations of a normal distribution  (      
 ) in which           
indicates that the expected value of     is influenced by different factors with a constant variance.    In 
the empirical analysis, one of the elements of 
itz  is specified as a time trend to allow technical 
inefficiency to change with time. 
 
The parameters of the model are estimated via maximum likelihood and, following Battese and Coelli 
(1988), the technical efficiency (
itTE ) point estimators are obtained as [exp( ) | ]it itE u  .  In estimating 
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the enhanced hyperbolic distance function model, the regressors *   kit kit Mitx x y , 
*   /mit mit Mity y y  and 
*   rit rit Mitb b y  in equation (4) are considered to be exogenous.  
 
4. Data description 
The database upon which the analysis is based comes from a variety of sources. In each year the 
majority of the data (annual information on approximately 375 credit unions|) was provided by the Irish 
league of Credit Unions (ILCU). Data for credit unions affiliated to the Credit Union Development 
Association (CUDA), those that are independent of any trade body and those who had not filed returns 
to the ILCU were collected manually from the annual reports of the credit unions in question (25-30 
credit unions per year). It should be noted that the data provided by member credit unions to the ILCU 
is unaudited. A nine year period is analysed from 2002 to 2010.   
 
There are 404 credit unions registered in Ireland and this number has remained broadly stable over the 
course of the investigation period. Unfortunately a small number of credit unions failed to file returns 
in specific years and for others certain aspects of the data were either incomplete or inconsistent. In 
Table 1 we report summary statistics for the credit unions analysed in each of the years under 
consideration.  It can be seen that between 2002 and 2009 our sample set consisted of a minimum of 
374 (90.1%) in 2002 and a maximum of 399 (97.1%) in 2006.  In 2010, the final year of the sample, we 
have only been able to obtain annual returns for 178 (44%) of credit unions primarily because the 
supervisory function provided by the ILCU has in large part now been made redundant by the more 
overt monitoring of credit unions by the Central Bank. This has led to a number of credit unions not 
filing returns with the ILCU. Unfortunately the Central Banks does not provide data on individual 
credit unions to independent researchers. 
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In the modeling of the productive process of credit unions there a number of ways in which inputs and 
outputs are specified – intermediation, production, value added, user-cost and asset approaches.  The 
intermediation approach has tended to dominate empirical research (including the only other study on 
Irish credit unions, Glass et al. (2010)). Worthington (2010) suggests that the predominance of the 
intermediation approach is due to its adaptability which flows from the fact that categories of deposits, 
loans, financial investments and financial borrowings may be arbitrarily assigned to either inputs or 
outputs or excluded on the basis of a priori reasoning.  
 
In this study the intermediation approach is utilised with a three input, three ‘good’ output and one 
‘bad’ output process specified. The inputs are: (i) labour expenditure,   , (salaries, pension 
contributions, training and treasurer’s honorarium), (ii) capital expenditure,   , (premises, equipment, 
depreciation, rent rates, light, heating, cleaning, repairs and renewals, equipment lease and maintenance 
expenditure)  and (iii) fund expenses,   ,  (interest paid on deposits and dividends paid on members’ 
shares). The ‘good’ outputs are: (i) members’ funds,   ,  (members’ shares and members’ deposits), (ii) 
loans to members,   , and (iii) earning assets,   ,(bank deposits, European Union (EU) government 
bonds, bank bonds and equity investments). The ‘bad’ output,   , is impaired assets which are impaired 
loans adjusted for investment losses. Mean and standard deviation values for the period 2002-2010 are 
presented for each of these variables in Table 1a.  
 
The modeling process also provides insights into how certain producer-specific environmental 
variables influence credit union inefficiency. A number of variables proved important and summary 
statistics for these variables are detailed in Table 1b and 1c. The continuous variables in question are 
asset size; dividend ratio; return on assets (surplus/total assets); capital ratio and a liquidity ratio (see 
table 1c for details). Categorical variables are included to distinguish credit unions in terms of their 
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common bond type, compliance with regulatory capital requirements and whether they have embraced 
web technology for product and service delivery. It should be noted that there is a relatively low level 
of web-based delivery of products and services. This can be traced to the failure in 2001 to introduce an 
integrated IT solution for Irish credit unions. This initiative cost €100m without any tangible end result. 
It then necessitated credit unions seeking IT solutions on an individual basis.  However, such an 
approach is sub-optimal as even the largest credit unions do not have the financial resources to put in 
place systems which would enable them to compete effectively with, for example, the retail banks.  
 
In the modeling of the productive process we also include a dummy variable to distinguish between 
credit unions with occupational/associational and community based common bonds. In an Irish context 
these two groups of credit unions are viewed as being subject to differences in their productive 
processes. Occupational credit unions draw their membership from a pre-designated employee group 
and by definition the membership is likely to be in either full- or part-time employment. Savings and 
loan repayments are invariably deducted straight from salary and in consequence these credit unions 
are subject to minimal bad debt problems. In contrast, community based credit unions draw their 
membership from a geographic area and this membership will be a mix of the employed, unemployed 
and retired. Linking savings and loan repayments directly to salary will not be an option for all 
members of community based credit unions. Furthermore, occupational credit unions in that they have 
a ‘quasi-captive’ membership will find it much easier to market and target products and services. This 
well-defined market could however also be viewed as an Achilles heel in that it implies that the 
membership mix of the credit union is undiversified and if the parent employer should face difficulties 
it will have a disproportionate effect on the credit union. From Table 1c we note that approximately 
90% of credit unions have a community based common bond.  
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From the information presented in Table 1a an insight can be obtained into two of the primary 
challenges now facing Irish credit unions -  a decline in the loan book (with an associated rise in 
investments) and a rise in bad debts. From Table 1a we can calculate that the average loan to asset ratio 
has declined from 57.21% in 2002 to 39.07% (2010) and that investments as a percentage of assets have 
increased from 39.51% in 2002 to 47.36% in (2010). The guidance from the World Council of Credit 
Unions (WOCCU) suggests that an appropriate value for the loan to asset ratio should be somewhere 
between 70 and 80 percent. This emphasises that credit unions in Ireland are significantly ‘under lent’.  
 
Under lending has been an ongoing problem for the Irish movement since the late 1990s and has two 
main causes. First the loan product portfolio on offer from Irish credit unions is quite restricted and 
second competition in the financial market has intensified during at least the early part of the estimation 
period. There is however evidence that the financial crisis has led to the exit of some financial 
institutions from the Irish market (HBOS and PostBank) and significant retrenchment by others thus 
reducing competitive pressures (see Hanley and Rae, 2010). This respite is likely to be short-lived as 
commitments have been made by the Irish Government to the EU Competition Authority to undertake a 
set of measures “to restore competition in the Irish banking market by facilitating entry and expansion 
of competitors and enhancing the consumer protection in the financial sectors”.1  
 
From Table 1a we can also see that impaired assets have risen sharply since the start of the economic 
downturn. Between 2007 and 2008 impaired assets increased on average by 35% from €495,000 to 
€673,000, increasing by a further 35% between 2008 and 2009 and by an additional 33% between 2009 
and 2010. These problems can be directly linked to the downturn in the Irish economy. In Ireland, 
personal consumer expenditure fell by 1.1% in 2008, 6.9% in 2009 and 0.8% in 2010 while the 
                                                 
1
 http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/state_aids/comp-2009/n546-09.pdf 
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unemployment rate increased to 6.3% in 2008, 11.8% in 2009 and 13.6% in 2010, (IBEC, January 
2012).  
 
5. Empirical results 
The empirical results for the estimated model are presented in Table 2.  
5.1. Elasticities 
The parameter estimates for the 
k  (input elasticities) indicate the magnitude of the respective input 
elasticities at the sample mean. Table 2 shows that all 
k  have the expected negative sign and are 
significantly different from zero. The negative signs found are expected as any increase in the amount 
of inputs used (ceteris paribus) would mean a greater distance to the frontier. The 
k  values reveal that 
while the labour expenses (
1 x ) and capital expenses ( 2 x ) elasticities are very similar in size  ( 1  = -
0.157 and 
2  = -0.121, respectively), the higher funds expenses ( 3x ) elasticity value ( 3  = -0.198) 
indicates the relatively more important role of this input in the credit union production process. 
 
The estimated undesirable output parameter 
1  (bad output elasticity) which is significantly different 
from zero, also has the expected negative sign in Table 2. When compared to the sizes of the input 
elasticity values, the impaired loans and investments elasticity value (
1  = -0.071) is lower  indicating 
that, while still important, impaired loans and investments have relatively less importance in the 
distance function characterization. 
 
The statistically significant 
m  estimates (good output elasticities), recorded in Table 2, all have the 
expected positive sign. This indicates that any increase in the amount of good outputs produced (ceteris 
paribus) would mean a smaller distance to the frontier. From Table 2, it can be seen that the relative 
sizes of the output elasticities show (as expected) loans (    to be considerably more important in the 
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credit union production process than earning assets (  ) – the respective elasticity values being. 
  =0.168 and   =0.048.  The finding that the earning assets elasticity is extremely low is a result of 
some importance in that it emphasizes that a further increase in an already ‘unhealthily’ high level of 
investments would result in only a marginal reduction in the distance to the frontier. 
 
5.2. Returns to scale  
Returns to scale measures for distance functions can be obtained in terms of the input and output 
elasticities. From Table 2, it can be seen that the estimated value of the term is [(-2
k k ) - 1 ] = 
1.0202, thus suggesting increasing returns to scale. Computation of the relevant standard error (0.0044) 
indicates that this finding of increasing returns to scale is significantly different from one (the constant 
returns to scale case) at the 5% level.  
 
The finding of increasing returns to scale for Irish credit unions is consistent with what tends to be 
found for other credit union movements. Esho (2000), for Australian credit unions, found very 
pronounced increasing returns to scale. Murray and White (1983) and Kim (1986) both found ‘slightly’ 
increasing returns to scale for Canadian credit unions, while McKillop et al. (1995) and McKillop et al. 
(2002) found increasing and mainly non-decreasing returns to scale, respectively, for UK credit unions. 
Similar to the latter study, Sibbald and McAlevey (2002) found mainly non-decreasing returns to scale 
for credit unions in New Zealand, while both Glass and McKillop (2006) and Wheelock and Wilson 
(2011) found evidence of increasing returns to scale for US credit unions. 
 
The finding of increasing returns to scale is also supportive of one of the policy recommendations 
emanating from the Irish Commission on Credit unions (2012) which advocates the establishment of a 
restructuring board to facilitate and incentivize credit union amalgamations “to provide the opportunity 
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to stronger credit unions to develop a more sophisticated – and ultimately more sustainable – business 
model and provide a mechanism to sort through the financial stresses in the sector in an orderly way”. 
 
5.3Technical progress  
Time dummies were included to capture neutral technical change. Table 2 records that six of the time 
dummies coefficients (
t ) are statistically different from zero. Four of these coefficients have a 
negative and significant sign, indicating technical progress or upward shifts in the production frontier 
while two have a positive and significant sign indicating technical regression or inward shifts in the 
frontier. It is noticeable that technical regression occurs in the period post 2007. Overall the values of 
these coefficients do suggest that aggregate technical regression of 2.62% was experienced over the 
2002-2009 period (the coefficient estimate for 2010 is statistically insignificant so isn’t considered in 
this calculation), thus giving an average annual rate of decline 0.33% over this period.   
 
The technical regression of recent times may in part be linked to the uncertain and increasingly 
unstable environment that credit unions are now experiencing. Prior to 2008, cost to income ratios for 
credit unions trended around 47.0% since then they have steadily increased 62.2% (2008), 74.4% 
(2009) and 83.3% (2010) with much of this increase driven by higher levels of provisioning. In such a 
deteriorating market environment credit unions are understandably reluctant to invest in infrastructural 
and technological enhancements and without such continued investment, technology becomes 
uncompetitive and technical regression may occur. 
 
In the modeling of the productive process we also include a dummy variable with coefficient  , to 
distinguish between credit unions with occupational and community common bonds arguing that these 
two groups are subject to differences in their productive processes. The coefficient  
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  is negative (-0.041) and significant at the 1% level indicating that more occupational rather than 
community credit unions raise credit union output. This reinforces the earlier observation that 
occupational credit unions, relative to community credit unions, have advantages in terms of a 
membership in full- or part-time employment and in the ease with which products and services can be 
marketed to members.  
 
5.4. Technical efficiency scores 
In proceeding to examine the technical efficiency scores, we first test the null hypothesis of no 
technical inefficiency. This test enabled us to reject the null hypothesis of no technical inefficiency 
effects in the Irish credit union production process. Since technical inefficiency does help to explain 
deviation from the production frontier, we can now examine how Irish credit unions could potentially 
improve their productive performance. 
 
As the mean technical efficiency value for the estimated translog EHDF was 0.844 with a standard 
deviation of 0.137. The mean technical efficiency value suggests that the Irish credit unions sector 
could improve its productive performance by expanding its desirable outputs by 18.48% (1/0.844 = 
1.1848), while simultaneously contracting its impaired loans and investments output and inputs by 
16.6% (1 – 0.844 = 0.166). Note, in getting this empirical evaluation of productive performance, the 
translog EHDF model has the desirable property of crediting the credit unions for impaired loans and 
investments reduction as well as for desirable output expansion and input reduction. As Cuesta et al 
(2009) note, this enables a comprehensive approach to efficiency measurement which takes into 
account all outputs and input dimensions. This comment is particularly pertinent for Irish credit unions. 
Take as an example the manner in which the main trade association, the ILCU, oversees its member 
credit unions. On a quarterly basis credit unions are required to complete a report from which a range 
of compliance ratios are calculated. These ratios focus on all aspects of a credit union’s business model 
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including cost and financial structure, output mix, asset quality, and growth objectives. Guidance in the 
form of norms for the respective ratios are stipulated by the ILCU with the implicit recognition that 
adherence to for example cost based norms and loan loss targets will necessarily have implications for 
output mix and output levels. 
 
In Figure 1 we present the kernel density estimate of the distribution of the technical efficiency scores. 
The estimated density indicates that the efficiency scores are clustered around 0.90. There is a 
pronounced left tail to the distribution with credit union technical efficiency being as low as 0.23. 
Overall approximately 31 percent of the efficiency values (1042 observations) are less than the mean 
technical efficiency score of 0.84. 
 
 
5.5. Factors influencing the technical efficiency of credit unions 
In this section we discuss how the variables in the error term influence technical efficiency. Since the 
dependent variable is technical inefficiency, then a negative coefficient (the δs in Table 2) means that 
as the variable goes up this reduces inefficiency (or raises efficiency).  A number of interesting findings 
emerge. 
 
As the asset size of a credit union increases efficiency improves up to an optimal level (this can be seen 
from the significant quadratic relationship that exists, with the coefficient of the square of asset size 
being positive and statistically significant). This may be indicative of the fact that up to a certain size 
there are scale and scope economies to be achieved.  To explore the relationship between size and 
efficiency further we analysed the distribution of efficiency scores relative to asset size for credit 
unions in five size bands (less than €20 million, €20million to less than €40million, €40 million to less 
than €60million, €60 million to less than €100 million and greater than €100 million). The key result to 
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emerge was that credit unions with assets in excess of €100m are much more efficient on average than 
those in the other size categories. 
 
Our analysis also highlighted that better capitalised credit unions are more efficient however set against 
that it was also the case that credit unions which held excessive levels of capital were found to be 
relatively inefficient. The distribution of the efficiency scores for credit unions that fell beneath 
regulatory capital guidelines over the period against those that met the capital requirements was also 
considered. The analysis demonstrated that those credit unions meeting capital requirements are on 
average more efficient that those that fail to meet the regulatory reserve guidelines. The Irish 
Commission on Credit unions (2012) found capital levels a problem for a number of credit unions. The 
Commission reported that there were 51 credit unions that as of December 2011 did not meet 
regulatory capital requirements.  Furthermore the Prudential Capital Assessment Review undertaken by 
the Central Bank indicates that “the financial position of a significant number of credit unions will 
deteriorate markedly between now [March 2012] and 2013.” Our analysis suggests that these credit 
unions are likely to have higher levels of technical inefficiency. 
 
Occupational or associational credit unions are more efficient than their community based counterparts. 
The better performance of occupational/associational credit unions as earlier argued is influenced by 
the fact that the majority of their members are in salaried employment, whereas community credit 
unions may have a proportion of unemployed members. For certain occupational/associational credit 
unions there may also be some hidden ‘in kind’ advantages, for example many 
occupational/associational credit unions not only operate direct payroll deduction of loan repayments 
but also have a savings plan linked to salary. 
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Credit unions that pay a higher dividend to their members are more efficient but credit unions with 
higher liquidity levels are less efficient. This latter result is not intuitively obvious. It occurs because 
credit unions in Ireland are under lent and in consequence many credit unions  hold an excessive part of 
their asset base in highly liquid assets which although low risk will also be low return. The regulatory 
required liquidity ratio for credit unions is currently set at 20% however the average liquidity ratio in 
2010 was 47.36% (see Table 1b).  
 
A dummy variable is included to account for whether a credit union has a website.  We do not 
distinguish between websites which are solely information based and those that enable financial 
transactions to be performed. Our findings suggest that credit unions with a website are more efficient 
than those that do not have a website. This ‘customer facing’ technological change brings with it 
additional delivery channels for a credit union’s product offerings.  Thus providing an increased 
flexibility to existing members coupled with lower per member processing costs. 
 
Finally, we found deterioration in efficiency levels over the period 2002-2010 as earlier indicated this 
is to be expected given the significant deterioration in the Irish economy in recent years which has 
placed the business model of many credit unions under significant pressure. The Irish Commission on 
Credit unions (2012) highlights this when it states .. “the adverse economic conditions have resulted in 
a decline in credit union performance and have made it difficult for credit unions to replenish reserves 
through retained earnings, …. the declining fortunes of the Irish economy have not only put an 
additional brake on credit union development but arguably have contributed to regression in some 
credit unions.” 
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5.6. Substitutability and complementariness relations in production 
Morrison-Paul et al (2000) have demonstrated how second-order cross terms can yield additional 
insights about interactions in the production process.  For example, they show how 
kl  reflects the 
extent of input substitutability or complementarity between inputs 
kx  
and 
lx .  They note that an 
increase in 
lx  will both expand overall production and raise the marginal productivity of those inputs 
for which it is complementary more than those for which it is a substitute.   
 
Table 3 shows that (in absolute terms) several of the values are not small in magnitude when compared 
to the corresponding first order (
k ) value. For example, Table 3 indicates that the labour expenses (
1 x ) and capital expenses ( 2 x ) inputs are complementary in production, with an increase in one 
increasing the other's contribution to production. In contrast, Table 3 shows that relatively high 
substitutability exists between the funds expenses (
3x ) input and the capital expenses ( 2 x ) input and 
between the funds expenses input (
3x ) and the labour expenses ( 1 x ) input. The latter findings suggest, 
for example, that an increase in capital or labour expenses reduce the funds expenses input’s 
contribution to production. 
 
Similar cross terms, involving output and input interactions can be defined. In Table 3, a number of 
cross terms are not recorded (since the     and     parameter estimates are statistically insignificant in 
Table 2). The reported cross term values of -0.0137 and -0.0059 indicate that an increase in either the 
loans output (
1y ) or the earning assets output ( 2y ) raises the funds expenses ( 3x ) input’s contribution 
to production with, as expected, the impact of  
1y  
on the productivity of 
3x  more pronounced. 
 
Table 3 records the computed values of the cross terms between the respective inputs and the bad 
output. The recorded values are 0.0541, 0.0278 and -0.0199 which suggests that an increase in impaired 
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assets  
1b  reduces the labour ( 1 x ) and capital expenses ( 2 x ) contribution to production and raises the 
funds expenses (
3x ) contribution to production. The latter result may follow from the fact that a rise in 
good loans (
2y ) raises 3x ’s productivity and the complementariness found between good loans ( 2y ) 
and impaired loans and investments (
1b ), as reported below, means that as 2y  rises 1b  also rises 
yielding a negative value, as above. 
 
Measures reflecting the interaction between desirable outputs can also be defined and are reported in 
Table 3. The computed values are 0.0085 and 0.0133 and indicate substitutability between the good 
loans and investments outputs in production, that is a rise in good loans (    output reduces the 
investments      output’s contribution to production and vice versa. As earlier noted there has been a 
sustained fall in loans as a proportion of assets and a commensurate rise in investments as a proportion 
of assets over the period under investigation. The Irish Commission on Credit unions (2012) is 
suggesting less restrictive business lending for larger credit unions and that credit unions be permitted 
to provide additional products /services subject to meeting specific requirements set by Central Bank. 
Our analysis would suggest that such a development would enable credit unions to beneficially 
rebalance their portfolios away from investments and towards loans. 
 
Following Grosskopf et al (1995), Cuesta et al (2009) indicate how the translog EHDF can yield 
information about the relative difficulty or ease of substitutability between a desirable output 
my and 
the undesirable output 
1b .  In interpreting such values, Cuesta et al (2009) note that the more negative 
(greater in absolute terms) values signal a higher opportunity cost of 
my  in terms of 1b  (relative 
complementariness) and vice versa.  The estimated values are presented in Table 4. From Table 4, it 
can be seen that the highest relative complementariness  (-32.4878) is found between good loans and 
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impaired loans and investments as expected.  Table 4 also shows that the absolute values are all well 
beyond unity, suggesting that regulatory guidance to encourage impaired loans and investments to be 
kept to a minimum would have a substantial impact on credit union output and performance. This is 
precisely what prudential guidance, as implemented by the Central Bank, strives to secure by it 
requiring that credit unions minimize impaired loans and investments.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This study examines the relative performance of Irish credit unions over the period 2002 to 2010. The 
approach used rewards credit unions for reducing undesirable outputs (impaired loans and investments) 
as well as for increasing desirable outputs and decreasing inputs. Four important findings emerge 
which are supportive of policy measures now being advocated to bring forward significant legislative 
change for Irish credit unions including a new Credit Union Act (Credit Union Bill published 
September 2012) and structural reform (Credit Union Restructuring Board appointed August 2012). 
These changes are in part structural benchmarks for the EU-IMF support now being provided to 
Ireland. 
 
First, it was estimated that on average Irish credit unions could improve productive performance by 
expanding desirable outputs by 18.5% while simultaneously contracting impaired loans and 
investments and inputs by 16.6%, that Irish credit unions are subject to increasing returns to scale and 
that larger credit unions are more efficient than their smaller counterparts. The Irish Commission on 
Credit Unions (2012) had as one of its main policy recommendations the establishment of a Credit 
Union Restructuring Board to provide technical advice and capital funding to incentivise a major 
restructuring of the sector. This restructuring will involve the identification of anchor credit unions, 
those that are strongest within the sector, with weaker credit unions then merged into the anchor credit 
unions to create much larger entities. Our findings demonstrating significant technical efficiency 
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differences, technical efficiency positively correlated with scale and a sector characterised by 
increasing returns to scale would suggest that the proposed restructuring will yield efficiency gains.  
Second, our analysis found that larger credit unions that are better capitalised and pay a higher dividend 
to members are more efficient than their smaller, less capitalised, and lower dividend paying 
counterparts. This would suggest that the Credit Union Restructuring Board should build the 
restructuring process on credit unions which are large in terms of their asset base, are well capitalized 
and have continued to provide a good dividend to their members over our investigative period. 
 
Third, we determined that there was a high degree of substitutability between loans and investments. A 
problem faced by Irish credit unions over the last decade is ongoing difficulties in the on-lending of 
funds and consequently accumulating an unhealthy level of investments. The Irish Commission on 
Credit Unions (2012) advocated that larger credit unions, that are capable of operating on a more 
sophisticated basis, should be allowed to offer a wider range of products and services and engage in a 
broader range of lending and investment activities. The Irish Credit Union Bill, published September 
2012, provides for a more sophisticated and more permissive regulatory regime for larger credit unions. 
It details a three-tiered regulatory approach with ‘tier three credit unions’ (those with assets greater 
than €100m) having additional regulatory requirements but also enhanced product and service 
flexibility. Our empirical analysis supports such developments by suggesting that the availability of 
new loan offerings will act as an important substitute for investments, thus pushing credit unions 
towards a more appropriate balance between lending and investment activities.  
 
Fourth, over the investigative period technical regression is observed driven in the main by the post 
2007 period. This finding emphasizes the extent to which recent adverse economic conditions have 
resulted in a decline in credit union performance.  Challenging times are expected to continue, IBEC 
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(2012) forecasts a decline in consumer expenditure and increases in unemployment in 2012 and 2013 
while the Central Bank’s Prudential Capital Assessment Review of credit unions anticipates a further 
deterioration in the financial position of a significant number of credit unions. This unpromising future 
for credit unions adds further support to the need for restructuring.  
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Table 1a 
Descriptive statistics 
Outputs Members funds(000s)  Loans(000s)  Earning Assets(000s) Impaired Assets(000s) 
 Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
2002 16,897 21,638 11,176 14,969 7,870 11,038 239 381 
2003 19,494 25,033 11,979 16,059 9,922 13,850 303 453 
2004 22,376 28,809 12,966 17,284 12,094 16,821 359 546 
2005 24,946 31,060 13,579 16,603 14,374 20,032 404 609 
2006 25,965 32,165 13,745 16,717 15,413 21,354 441 682 
2007 24,332 31,084 13,468 18,071 14,203 19,619 495 779 
2008 24,458 30,839 14,319 18,842 13,509 18,986 673 980 
2009 25,197 31,725 14,040 18,764 14,986 19,992 914 1,283 
2010 23,241 21,941 11,951 12,079 15,023 15,709 1,218 1,397 
Total 23,005 29,049 13,101 16,982 12,944 18,085 519 852 
         
Inputs Labour expenses(000s) Capital expense(000s) Funds expenses(000s) Mean Ratio 
 Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Loan to Assets  Investments to 
Assets  
2002 157 172 47 46 380 665 57.21% 39.51% 
2003 174 195 51 52 417 733 52.97% 42.33% 
2004 206 244 55 55 348 506 49.18% 43.55% 
2005 216 233 61 65 398 605 46.07% 44.35% 
2006 228 248 65 68 429 707 42.66% 43.38% 
2007 233 249 64 66 407 752 41.44% 40.57% 
2008 257 285 70 70 508 880 43.61% 37.69% 
2009 279 307 74 77 409 777 43.05% 43.37% 
2010 261 250 70 64 256 407 39.07% 47.36% 
Total 221 248 61 64 403 699 46.54% 42.16% 
Note: All monetary variables are in euros and in 2002 real terms, having been deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 
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Table 1b 
Descriptive statistics 
Environmental 
variables 
Total Assets(000s) Dividend ratio  Return on Assets Capital Ratio Pearl Liquidity ratio 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
2002 19,549 25,322 2.10% 1.06% 0.80% 1.49% 9.97% 2.97% 39.51% 14.30% 
2003 22,872 29,645 2.00% 1.03% 0.75% 1.59% 10.23% 3.01% 42.33% 13.75% 
2004 26,872 34,737 1.72% 1.79% 0.75% 1.53% 10.28% 3.48% 43.55% 13.19% 
2005 30,769 38,237 1.53% 0.87% 0.73% 1.52% 10.41% 2.99% 44.35% 12.29% 
2006 33,681 41,565 1.51% 0.80% 2.07% 1.93% 12.48% 3.15% 43.38% 11.61% 
2007 33,469 42,683 1.49% 0.93% 2.40% 2.06% 13.83% 3.15% 40.57% 11.76% 
2008 33,942 42,659 1.81% 0.98% 2.71% 2.31% 13.63% 3.20% 37.69% 12.26% 
2009 33,319 41,629 1.40% 0.95% 2.36% 2.39% 12.74% 3.24% 43.37% 12.25% 
2010 30,959 29,301 0.87% 0.73% 1.42% 1.73% 12.45% 2.94% 47.36% 11.75% 
Total 29,444 37,509 1.65% 1.11% 1.56% 2.04% 11.74% 3.48% 42.16% 12.87% 
Table 1c 
Categorical variables 
 Common Bond Type Regulatory reserve requirement Internet Technology Adoption 
 community occupational Total Under 
Capitalisted 
Appropriately 
Capitalised 
Total No website Live website Total 
2002 343 31 374 222 152 374 308 66 374 
2003 353 31 384 183 201 384 305 79 384 
2004 357 32 389 177 212 389 300 89 389 
2005 351 36 387 164 223 387 286 101 387 
2006 364 35 399 139 260 399 291 108 399 
2007 353 32 385 82 303 385 270 115 385 
2008 348 35 383 65 318 383 203 180 383 
2009 351 31 382 204 178 382 203 179 382 
2010 163 15 178 82 96 178 102 76 178 
Total 2983 278 3261 1318 1943 3261 2268 993 3261 
Capital Ratio >8% in period 2002-2008 or >10% post 2008. *Capital ratio is below the regulatory reserve requirement.
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Table 2 
Parameter estimates for the translog enhanced hyperbolic distance function 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
error 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
error 
   0.500*** 0.010     0.026** 0.012 
   -0.157*** 0.005     0.041*** 0.009 
   -0.121*** 0.009   -0.041*** 0.012 
   -0.198*** 0.003     -0.001 0.006 
    -0.051*** 0.003     -0.020*** 0.008 
    0.009*** 0.003     -0.032*** 0.008 
    0.014*** 0.001     -0.044*** 0.008 
    -0.031*** 0.005     -0.024*** 0.009 
    0.013*** 0.001     0.0124 0.009 
    -0.046*** 0.001     0.0262*** 0.010 
   0.168*** 0.019     0.006 0.014 
   0.048*** 0.017    1.921 1.588 
    0.177*** 0.036    0.032*** 0.004 
    0.034** 0.017    -2.782** 1.184 
    0.048*** 0.018    0.321 0.328 
   -0.071*** 0.003    -0.105*** 0.043 
    -0.043*** 0.004    -0.506*** 0.183 
    -0.015 0.015    0.309* 0.181 
    -0.044*** 0.017    0.406*** 0.070 
    0.018*** 0.005    -0.179*** 0.073 
    -0.044*** 0.011    0.0525** 0.026 
    -0.016* 0.010     -0.291*** 0.026 
    0.014*** 0.004     -0.029* 0.015 
    0.027*** 0.003  
  0.037*** 0.002 
    0.014*** 0.003   0.9118*** 0.067 
    0.010*** 0.001 Ln L  2624.89  
   ̅̅ ̅̅    0.844                       0.014  
Note: * 10% significance level ** 5% significance level ***1% significance level.  
 The     ( j = 1, …, 9) are the coefficients of the z variables influencing technical inefficiency, as given in (21), with    relating to  a 
time trend;    to dividend ratio;   to return on assets;   to regulatory reserve requirements dummy (appropriately capitalised 1, 
undercapitalised 0);    to capital ratio;    to interaction term between capital ratio and regulatory reserve requirement dummy;    to Pearl 
liquidity ratio;    to log of total assets;    to square of the log of total assets;     to common bond type dummy (occupational 1, 
community 0) and    to internet technology adoption dummy (live website 1, otherwise 0).  Also,  
    
    
 ;     
    
    
  ⁄
 
; 
and   ̅̅̅̅    is the mean technical efficiency score. 
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Table 3 
Elasticities 
First order components 
Loans Other Earning 
Assets
 
Labour Capital Funds 
0.1797 0.0307 -0.1586 -0.1205 -0.1951 
Second order cross components
 
 Labour Capital Funds 
Labour 0.1138 -0.0165 0.0333 
Capital -0.0169 0.0561 0.0319 
Funds 0.024 0.0208 -0.1143 
Impaired Loans & Investments 0.0541 0.0278 -0.0199 
Loans  -0.0093 -0.0137 
Other Earning Assets
 
0.0176  -0.0059 
 Loans
 
Other Earning 
Assets
 
 
Impaired Loans & Investments -0.0069 -0.0159  
Other Earning Assets
 
0.0085   
Loans  0.0133  
Note: From Table 2, the bad output elasticity at the sample mean is 
1  = -0.071. The gaps in the above table arise when the 
relevant parameter estimates are statistically insignificant, so that the corresponding interactive measures cannot be 
computed.  
 
 
 
Table 4 
Good (
my ) and bad ( 1b ) output substitutability  
 Loans
 
Other Earning Assets
 
Impaired Loans & Investments
 
-32.4878 -27.7925 
Note: The above values are computed by observation. 
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